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Abstract: Much work in robotics and operations research has focused on optimal
resource distribution, where an agent dynamically decides how to sequentially
distribute resources among different candidates. However, most work ignores the
notion of fairness in candidate selection. In the case where a robot distributes re-
sources to human team members, disproportionately favoring the highest perform-
ing teammate can have negative effects in team dynamics and system acceptance.
We introduce a multi-armed bandit algorithm with fairness constraints, where a
robot distributes resources to human teammates of different skill levels. In this
problem, the robot does not know the skill level of each human teammate, but
learns it by observing their performance over time. We define fairness as a con-
straint on the minimum rate that each human teammate is selected throughout the
task. We provide theoretical guarantees on performance and perform a large-scale
user study, where we adjust the level of fairness in our algorithm. Results show
that fairness in resource distribution has a significant effect on users’ trust in the
system.
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1 Introduction
We focus on the problem of resource distribution in human-robot teams. For instance, a factory
robot assists several workers by delivering parts needed for an engine assembly. Some workers are
experienced and fast, others are inexperienced and slow. The robot, unaware of each workers expe-
rience level, must decide how to distribute resources. If the robot is optimal in the traditional sense,
it should first assign resources to learn the performance of each individual worker (exploration) and
then assign as many pieces as possible to the most experienced worker (exploitation).
This approach, however, fails to account that assigning more resources to the highest performing
worker may be perceived as unfair by the other worker. In turn, this may affect their perception
of the interaction and trust in the system. In fact, previous work has shown that ignoring human
preferences in task allocation can negatively affect users’ willingness to work with the system [1].
Ultimately, team performance depends to a large degree on people’s interpersonal orientation, i.e.,
how people perceive each other and interact with each other [2]. Groom and Nass [3] argue that
our ability to build effective human-robot teams depends on a team’s ability to build trust between
all members of a team, and much work in human-robot interaction has focused on establishing
perceived team fluency and trust in human-robot teams [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
We focus on the notion of fairness in resource distribution. We formalize how a robot can maximize
performance, while guaranteeing that each human teammate will be assigned a minimum rate of
resources at any given time throughout the task. Our thesis is that, by accounting for fairness in
resource allocation, we can significantly improve users’ trust in the system.
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To this end, we cast the problem as a multi-armed bandit, where each human teammate is represented
as an arm with an unknown reward function corresponding to their skill level. We then propose
a multi-armed bandit algorithm with fairness constraints, which builds upon the standard Upper
Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm [10]. We propose a stochastic version of the algorithm, where
a minimum pulling rate for each arm is satisfied in expectation, and a deterministic version where
the constraint is strictly satisfied anytime throughout the task. We provide theoretical guarantees of
performance in the form of regret bounds for both algorithms.
To assess the effect of fairness on the users, we execute a large-scale user study on a Tetris game,
where two players are sequentially assigned a batch of blocks by the algorithm. We implement the
algorithm with three levels of fairness, representing the required minimum allocation rate for each
player: 25%, 33% and 50%.
Results show that fairness affects significantly the trust of the players that performed worse than their
teammates: those in the 33% condition trusted the system significantly more, compared to the 25%
condition. Surprisingly, we did not observe a decrease in performance in the fairer distributions,
even though the stronger player was selected less frequently. On the contrary, the median scores
were higher when fairness increased. These results improve our understanding of the theory and
implications of fairness in resource distribution in human-robot teams.
2 Background
2.1 Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandits
The stochastic multi-armed bandits (MAB) framework without a minimum pulling rate requirement
has been theoretically well studied. The gambler is tasked with choosing an arm, i, from K arms
at each time step t = 1, 2, 3, ., n. At every time t, the gambler pulls an arm it ∈ [K] while si-
multaneously the environment decides the reward vector rt ∈ [0, 1]K from a fixed distribution with
expectation E[rt(it)] = µ(it). The gambler, however, can only observe rt(it) but not the whole
vector. Therefore, the gambler’s goal is to pull the sequence of arms, based on the past information,
that can maximize the overall accumulated reward.
The best arm in hindsight is defined as i∗ = argmaxi∈[K] µ(i) and µ
∗ = µ(i∗). We use regret to
measure the performance of this algorithm, which is how worse our algorithm performs compared
to the benchmark strategy – always pulling the best arm in each step.
RegT = Tµ
∗ −
T∑
t=1
µ(it)
An optimal solution to such a problem was proposed as the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB). It
was originally introduced by Lai and Robbins [11] and expanded by Agrawal [12]. Building upon
these works, Auer, Cesa-Bianchi & Fisher [10] introduced the Upper Confidence Bound Algorightm
(UCB). At its most basic form of this algorithm, at each time t, we want to estimate the expected
reward of each arm by using the mean of its empirical rewards in the past and the number of times
it has been pulled, which gives us a confidence interval that the arm will lie in. Then the algorithm
proceeds to pick the arm with the largest estimated expected reward.
This work has inspired a family of upper confidence bound variant algorithms for an array of differ-
ent applications [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. For a review of these algorithms we point readers to [18].
More recent work regarding multi-armed bandits has seen applications towards the improvement
of human-robot interaction. Recent work has investigated using a MAB algorithm for the use of
an assistive robotic system with the goal of exploring human preferences [19] and assisting human
learning [20].
Of particular relevance is very recent work on sleeping bandits with fairness constraints [21], in
a setting where multiple arms can be played simultaneously and some arms may be unavailable.
Fairness is defined as a minimum rate satisfied in expectation and at the end of the task, whereas in
our work we require the rate to be satisfied strictly and anytime throughout the task. Fairness in the
context of MABs has also been studied in Joseph et al. [22]. The definition of fairness there is quite
different, in that a worse arm should not be picked compared to a better arm, despite the uncertainty
2
on payoffs. Their proposed algorithm chooses two arms with equal probability, until it has enough
data to deduce the best of the two arms.
2.2 Fairness in Resource Distribution
Human collaboration has been shown to have strong links to fairness [23]. While the actual defi-
nition of fairness is debated, we aim to look at it within the scope of resource distribution. In this
context, fairness relates to the degree of allocation that a resource is given to an individual within
a group [24]. While an equal distribution of resources across all members within a group seems
ideal, researchers [25, 26] have shown that inequalities are deemed appropriate, particularly when
they optimize the outcome of the group. On the other hand, perceived inequalities have a strong
impact on individuals’ behavior, often motivating them to act contrary to their rational self-interest
with the goal of eliminating the inequality [27, 28]. Previous work has shown that perceived lack of
fairness affects job satisfaction [29] and can induce retaliation behavior from the affected party [30].
Interestingly, individuals perceive fairness differently when decisions are made by an algorithm,
compared to a human [31, 32].
3 Algorithm
The original unconstrained UCB algorithm fails in ensuring “fairness” because when time passes,
a large set of bad arms will hardly be used again. Therefore, we propose two new algorithms with
optimal regret bound guarantees. Both of them are based on the unconstrained UCB algorithm,
where we adopt the idea of estimating the expected reward of each arm by using the mean of its
empirical rewards in the past and the number of times it has been pulled. We prove the following
theorems in the Appendix.
3.1 Strict-rate-constrained UCB Algorithm
Definition 1 Let S be any K-elements set whose elements are drawn from [ 1v ] without replacement.
Then define g : S → [K] as some one-to-one function.
Algorithm 1: Strictly-rate-constrained UCB
1 Input: time horizon T , arm set [K], minimum pull rate v
2 Definition: Denote UCBt(i) = 1t−1
∑t−1
s=1 rt(i)1{is = i}+ 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
, and τj be the starting
time of block j.
3 Initialize: t = 1, j = 1, τ1 = K + 1, τj = τ1 + j−1v .
4 while t ≤ K do
5 Pull arm it = t
6 t← t+ 1.
7 for j = 1, 2, 3, . . . do B j indexes a block
8 while t < τj+1 do
9 If t− τj + 1 ∈ S, then pull the arm it = g(t− τj + 1),
10 Otherwise, pull the arm it = argmaxi∈[K] UCBt(i)
11 t← t+ 1
The algorithm divides T into blocks with length 1v . The algorithm is flexible in that there are multiple
choices of S and g that satisfy the minimum rate constraint. For example, if v = 14 and K = 2, we
can choose S = {1, 3} and g(1) = 1, g(3) = 2, which means we always pull arm 1 at τj and arm 2
at τj + 2 for all j (see implementation in section 4).
This algorithm guarantees that IN PRACTICE the pulling rate at any time for each arm is at least v−,
by fixing certain time slots where the algorithm will pull the prescheduled arms. Here  = 1/t. 1 In
other time slots, the algorithm will behave just like the standard UCB.
1 We can prove this by observing that at time t, the arm i will be pulled at least btvc times according to the
pre-schedule. So the pulling rate will be btvc
t
≥ tv−1
t
= v − 1
t
.
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Now the benchmark strategy for pulling an arm is always pulling the best arm in those non-
prescheduled time slots. So the regret definition in this case becomes:
RegT = Eenv
[∑
t∈I
rt(i
∗)− rt(it)
]
where I is all the non-prescheduled time slots among T .
Theorem 1 By running Alg. 1, we obtain the regret bound that is close to the original unconstrained
UCB,
RegT ≤
∑
i:∆i>0
[
16 lnT
∆i
(
1−Kv
1− (K − 1)v
)
+ 2(1−Kv)2∆i
]
+O(K)
If ∆i ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, we also get the worst case guarantee,
RegT ≤ O(
√
TK lnT +K lnT )
3.2 Stochastic-rate-constrained UCB Algorithm
Algorithm 2: Stochastic-rate-constrained UCB
1 Input: time horizon T , arm set [K], minimum pull rate v
2 Definition: Denote UCBt(i) = 1t−1
∑t−1
s=1 rt(i)1{is = i}+ 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
.
3 Initialize: t = 1, j = 1, τ1 = K + 1, τj = τ1 + j−1v .
4 while t ≤ K do
5 Pull arm it = t
6 t← t+ 1.
7 for t = K + 1,K + 2,K + 3, . . . do
8 With probability 1−Kv, pull the arm it = argmaxi∈[K] UCBt(i),
9 Otherwise, uniformly pull an arm it from all K arms
This algorithm guarantees that the EXPECTED pulling rate at any time for each arm is at least v.
Instead of rescheduling some arms as in the deterministic algorithm above, this algorithm introduces
some randomness. At each time t, we ensure that each arm has at least v probability to be pulled;
while with 1 − Kv probability, the algorithm will again pull the arm with the best UCB bound.
We denote this distribution over arms as pt where pt(argmaxi∈[K] UCBt(i)) = (1−Kv) + v and
pt(i) = v,∀i ∈ [K] \ argmaxi∈[K] UCBt(i).
In this case, the benchmark strategy is pulling the best estimated arm with probability (1 −Kv) at
time t, otherwise uniformly drawing a random arm. We present this strategy with the distribution p∗
over K arms where p∗(i∗) = (1−Kv) + v and p∗(i) = v,∀i ∈ [K] \ i∗. So the regret definition in
this case becomes:
RegT = Eenv,learner
[
T∑
t=1
Eit∼p∗ [rt(it)]− Eat∼pt [rt(it)]
]
Theorem 2 By running Alg. 2, we obtain the regret bound that is close to the original unconstrained
UCB,
RegT ≤
∑
a:∆i>0
[
min
{
16 lnT
∆i
+ (1−Kv)∆i, (1−Kv)∆iT
}]
If ∆i ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, we also get the worst case guarantee,
RegT < O(
√
TK lnT +K ln(T ))
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Figure 1: (a) Pairs of two remote human participants were connected to our cooperative Tetris game
online. (b) The Tetris game followed the standard rules with two slight modifications. A different
scoring metric as shown and only one participant had access to control the pieces per turn. (c) A
visual representation of the three separate patterns that each condition offered.
4 User Study
We wish to assess the effect of implementing the UCB algorithm with different fairness constraints
in a setting where resources are distributed to human team members. We focus on a setting with
two human teammates taking turns in completing a task. The system chooses at each turn which
teammate should complete the task. We characterize the player that has the best performance of the
two, as observed at the end of the task, as strong and the the other player as weak. The challenge
of balancing between choosing the historically best player or a sub-optimal player allows us to
investigate the impact of the system’s decision on team performance, perceived fairness and trust
in the system. To reduce variance from sampling, we implemented the strict-rate-constrained UCB
Algorithm (Alg. 1).
We make the following hypotheses:
H1: Fairness will have a significant effect on perceived fairness and trust in the system of the weak
players. We focus on the weak players, since previous work [30] has shown that in unfair situations,
adverse reactions mainly occur by the affected party.
H2: Fairness will have a significant effect on team performance. The fairer distributions favor the
weak players, since they impose a constraint on the minimum number of pulls for both players. We
expect that this will result in worse performance, compared to the less fair distributions that favor
the strong player of the team.
4.1 Methodology
We developed a collaborative Tetris game and paired teams of two humans with a computer system
running our MAB algorithm. The Tetris game challenges the spatial reasoning, reflex and decision
speed of each individual. Each team’s objective is to clear as many filled rows as possible by manip-
ulating falling geometric pieces with the goal of obtaining the largest score under the allotted time
frame. Our study had three conditions, each corresponding to a different fairness level, represented
as a constraint on the minimum rate of arm pulls, that is on the minimum rate that a player is selected
to play: 50%-UCB, 33%-UCB and 25%-UCB. We used a between-subjects design to avoid ordering
effects. The system design is shown in Fig. 1.
We formally define our scenario as follows. The number of players in each game is set as P = {1, 2}
over a time horizon of T = {1, 2, ..., 30}. At each time step t ∈ T , seven consecutive Tetris pieces
are allotted to a player p ∈ P . In the turns where the UCB algorithm was run, the upper confidence
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Factor Question Number Question
Decision 
Fairness
Q1 How fair or unfair is it for your partner that the system gave them the designated number of Tetris pieces?
Q2 How fair or unfair is it for you that the system gave you the designated number of Tetris pieces?
Trust Q1 How much do you trust the system to make a good quality decision in the distribution of the Tetris pieces?
Table 1: The subjective metrics that were used in our user study.
bound was calculated using as reward rp,t:
rp,t =
Sp,t
M ∗ np,t
where Sp,t is the score achieved by player p up to turn t, np,t is the number of plays and M is a
maximum value that we selected for normalization. After multiple pilot sessions we empirically set
it to 300.
Measures: Information regarding an individual’s performance was stored in a database during game
play. We collected each player’s individual score as well as the number of turns that was allocated to
them. Additionally, we obtained the total score that each team accumulated at the end of the game
play. Fig 1(b) shows the scoring convention that we used.
To measure levels of perceived decision fairness and trust we adapted survey questions from [33]
(Table 1). Each response was measured on a seven-point Likert scale.
Procedures: We recruited participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk and utilized Qualtrics to
create and collect survey question responses. Upon entering basic demographic information, AMT
participants were instructed that they would be paired with a human partner and a computer system
that would decide who has control of the falling pieces. It was further stated that their objective was
to obtain the largest possible team score in the allotted turns. Our developed game platform then
selected pairs of remote players to begin the game. Following standard Tetris rules, a player could
rotate, speed up, or drop each falling piece. We defined each time step as a set of seven consecutive
falling pieces that only the selected player could control. At the end of the time step the 50%, 33%,
or 25% UCB, depending on condition, algorithm would run to select the next player.
Fig. 1(c) shows the pattern of the distribution that was seen across each condition. This pattern
was repeated for 30 time steps, with the exception of the first two time steps where each player
played once. Each team was exposed to 210 pieces total. A code was given to participants upon the
completion of the 30 rounds which enabled them to continue the Qualtrics survey.
Participants: We recruited a total of 290 participants from AMT and paid $1.00 for their participa-
tion in the task. 8 data points were removed, since their AMT unique ID did not match the one given
on Qualtrics. The final dataset contained N = 94, 98, 90 participants for UCB-50%, UCB-33%,
and UCB-25% respectively (156 female, 124 male, 1 other, 1 did not disclose). Participants were
recruited if they could speak English, were from the United States, and had previous ratings of 95%
or higher. The average age of participants was 36 years old (SD = 11).
4.2 Analysis
Subjective: We grouped the subjective responses of each pair of players based on their comparative
performance in the game (Fig. 2). We focus the analysis on the weak players, that is the players that
performed worse than their teammate. We present the responses of the strong players as well for
completeness.
A one-way ANOVA was performed for weak players across all conditions (UCB-50% vs. UCB-33%
vs. UCB-25%) for each subjective metric. Analysis indicates a significant effect of the reported trust
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Figure 2: Responses to the subjective questions, grouped by player performance across each con-
dition. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3: (Top) Percentage of the number of pieces that each player received. Each bar represents a
separate game. (Bottom) Box plots of the total scores that each player individually and both players
together achieved.
score of the weak players across the three conditions (F (2, 138) = 3.172, p = 0.025). A Tukey
HSD with adjusted p-values demonstrated higher trust (p = 0.037) towards the system running the
UCB-33% compared to the UCB-25%. While trust scores in UCB-50% were higher than in the
UCB-33%, the difference was not significant (p = 0.081). We found no other significant results in
the other factors.
Post-hoc Analysis. We observe in Fig. 2 a noticeable difference in the responses between the strong
and the weak players for different fairness conditions. Therefore, we conducted a post-hoc experi-
mental analysis of the data to assess whether the responses between the weak and the strong players
varied significantly depending on the executed algorithm. Indeed, a 2 x 3 ANOVA with strength
(weak vs. strong) and rate (UCB-50% vs. UCB-33% vs. UCB-25%) showed a main effect of play-
ers’ strength for Decision Fairness Q2 (F (1, 276) = 4.778, p = 0.0297). There were no interaction
effects. Post-hoc comparison with Bonferroni corrections looking at strength within the different
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Figure 4: (a) Total scores for each condition. (b) Average score per turn for each condition.
fairness levels, showed that weak players (M = 3.97, σ= 1.68) reported significantly lower ratings
on fairness (Q2) than their strong counterparts (M = 4.82, σ = 1.49) in the UCB 25% condition
(p = 0.035), which was the least fair condition. We observed no significant difference in perceived
fairness between strong and weak players in the other two conditions.
These results show that in the least fair condition, there was a significant difference between the weak
and the strong players in their perception of fairness. We also observe that reducing the minimum
rate from 33% to 25% had a negative effect on the trust of weak players. On the other hand, Fig. 2
shows that trust scores between the UCB-50% and UCB-33% conditions were comparable.
To interpret these results, we observe the number of pieces received (arm pulls) for each condition
in Fig. 3(top). In the UCB-50% condition, all players received the same number of pieces regardless
of their performance. In the UCB-33% condition, while the strong players received more pieces, the
difference with the weak players was small. On the other hand, in the UCB-25% condition there
were several games where the weak players received less than 30% of the pieces, resulting in lower
reported trust in that condition.
Objective: A one-way ANOVA on the performance of the two-player teams across the three condi-
tions indicated no statistical significance. In fact, Fig. 4(a) shows that the medians of the total scores
were higher for increasing levels of fairness. Plotting the individual scores of the players for each
game in Fig. 3(bottom) illustrates this tendency as well.
This result does not match our initial hypothesis. To interpret this result, we plot the average scores
per turn for each condition in Fig. 4(b). The average scores indicate how well the players performed
on average every time they took a turn. Interestingly, we see that the distribution of the weak players’
scores shifts towards lower scores as fairness decreases. While this result warrants further investiga-
tion, it indicates that assigning significantly less pieces to one of the players may negatively affect
their performance, in addition to reducing their trust in the system. It showcases the importance of
fairness when making resource distribution decisions.
5 Discussion
Limitations. Our work is limited in many ways. Algorithm 1 allows for a set of possible schedules
that satisfy the minimum rate constraint, based on our choice of S and g. For instance, in the
UCB-25% condition we chose to play the arm with the highest UCB bound in the second and
fourth timeslot, but we could also select the first and second timeslot. In fact, given a minimum
rate v there are (1/v)!(1/v−K)! permutations, and we have not captured the effect of different schedules
within a fairness condition. Our model also does not capture changes in the performance of the
individual players over time and it is worth exploring MAB algorithms that do not assume stationary
rewards [34].
Implications. Fairness in resource distribution will play an important role in human-robot team dy-
namics and we are excited to have brought about a better understanding of the relationships between
fairness, performance and trust in the system. We are also excited in exploring applications of these
ideas to manufacturing and assistive care settings, where a robot distributes resources to multiple
users.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Notations
Some notations have already been defined in the main section, but for clarity, we will restate here:
Denote ∆i = µi∗ − µi. Let µˆt(i) = 1t−1
∑t−1
s=1 rt(i) be the mean of empirical rewards for arm i at
time t so far and let nt−1(i) be the total number of times arm i has been pulled before time t. So
UCBt(i) = µˆt(i) +
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
and it = argmaxi∈[K] UCBt(i).
6.2 Auxiliary Theorems and Lemmas
Theorem 3 (Hoeffding’s Inequality) Let X1, ..., XT ∈ [−B,B] for some B > 0 be independent
random variables such that E[Xt] = 0,∀t ∈ [T ], then we have for all δ ∈ (0, 1),
Pr(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xt ≥ B
√
2 ln 1δ
T
) ≤ δ
Lemma 1 For all arm i, if the possible value range of nt−1(i) is [ks, ke], then
Prob
[
µ(i)− µˆt(i) ≥ 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
]
≤
ke∑
k=ks
1
T 2
Proof: We want to bound them by Hoeffding’s Inequality, however, one trap here is that nt−1(i)
is actually a random variable depending on all the rewards decided by the environment. To deal with
this issue, imagine there is a infinite sequence of X1(i), X2(i)... of independent samples of Di for
each action i and at time t observed reward rt(it) is the nt(it)-th sample of this sequence, that is,
rt(it) = Xnt(it)(it). So µˆt−1(i) as be written as µ˜nt−1(i)(i) =
1
nt−1(i)
∑nt−1(i)
k=1 Xk(i).
So now we want to know what is the possible value of nt−1(i). According to the assumption
nt−1(i) ∈ [ks, ke], we have,
Prob
[
µ(i)− µˆt−1(i) ≥ 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
]
≤ Prob
[
∃k ∈ [ks, ke] s.t.µ(i)− µ˜k(i) ≥ 2
√
lnT
k
]
≤
ke∑
k=k0
Prob
[
µ(i)− µ˜k(i) ≥ 2
√
lnT
k
]
≤
ke∑
k=k0
1
T 2
The penultimate inequality is by hoeffding’s inequality. 
6.3 Proof for Algorithm 1
6.3.1 Notations
We define I as the set of ”non-prescheduled” time slots among T . Let mt−1(i) be the total number
of times arm i has been pulled before time t and among I, so mt−1(i) ≤ nt−1(i). Also I[i] means
the j-th time slot in I.
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6.3.2 Main Proof
First we rewrite this regret in the form of variable ∆i and mT ,
E
[∑
t∈I
rt(i
∗)− rt(it)
]
= E
[∑
t∈I
µ∗ − µ(it)
]
= E
[∑
t∈I
∆it
]
=
∑
i6=i∗
∆iE [mT (i)]
Here the first expectation is regarding to the whole environment randomness through T . The first
equality comes from Eenv at t(rt) = µ.
Next we want to bound E [mT ] following the similar idea as in the original UCB paper.
E [mT (i)] = m+
∑
t∈I,t>I[m]
Prob [(it = i) and mt−1 ≥ m]
≤ m+
∑
t∈I,t>I[m]
Prob [UCBt(i) > UCBt(i
∗) and mt−1 ≥ m]︸ ︷︷ ︸
TERM1
Here m can be any non-negative integer. In the later analysis, choice of m helps us to get a tighter
bound.
Now we analyze the TERM1.
TERM1 ≤ Prob [UCBt(i∗) < µ(i∗)] + Prob [UCBt(i) > µ(i∗) and mt−1 > m]
≤ Prob
[
µ(i∗)− µˆt(i∗) ≥ 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i∗)
]
+ Prob
[
µˆt(i)− µ(i) ≥ ∆i − 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
and mt−1 > m
]
First, observe that Prob
[
µ(i∗)− µˆt(i∗) ≥ 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i∗)
]
has nothing to do with m, we can directly
apply Lemma 1 to get upper the bound. So now we want to know what is the [ks, ke]. First, because
we made K uniform explore rounds at beginning, so nt−1(i) should at least be 1. Then, because
at time t there will b(t − 1 −K)vc blocks and in each block we pull each arm at least once due to
pre-scheduling, so ks = b(t − 1 − K)vc + 1. Finally, because each arm will have been pulled at
least ks times, so ke = t− 1− (K − 1)k0. So the upper bound is
t−(K−1)ks−1∑
k=ks
1
T 2
≤
T−Kb(T−1−K)vc∑
k=1
1
T 2
≤ (1−Kv)
T
+
Kv +K2v + 1
T 2
≤ (1−Kv)
T
+O( K
T 2
)
Then we are going to deal with Prob
[
µˆt(i)− µ(i) ≥ ∆i − 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
and mt−1 > m
]
.
Again we want to use the Lemma 1, but we need to choose m at first. The reason we want to
choose m is that we consider the first m epoch the bound will be very loose, so we can directly
bound the probability by 1.
Notice we can easily make connections between nt−1(i) and m,
nt−1(i) ≥ bv(t− 1−K)c+mt−1 + 1
12
≥ (mt−1 − 1
v
+K) ∗ 11
v −K
+mt−1 + 1
≥ mt−1(1 + v
1−Kv ) ≥ m(1 +
v
1−Kv )
Where the last inequality comes from t > I[m] which means t ≤ K +m+ 1.
By choosing m = b 16 lnT
∆2i
∗ 1−Kv1−(K−1)v c,
∆i − 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
= 4
√
lnT
m(1 + v1−Kv )
− 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
≥ 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
Again replace the above result in the probability bound and use Lemma 1 as before, we get
Prob
[
µˆt(i)− µ(i) ≥ ∆i − 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
and mt−1 > m
]
≤ Prob
[
µˆt(i)− µ(i) ≥ 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
]
≤ (1−Kv)
T
+O( K
T 2
)
Therefore, we conclude bound for i 6= i∗ that
E[mT (i)] ≤ 16 lnT
∆2i
(
1−Kv
1− (K − 1)v
)
+
∑
t∈I,t>I[m]
(
2
(1−Kv)
T
+ 2O( K
T 2
)
)
≤ 16 lnT
∆2i
(
1−Kv
1− (K − 1)v
)
+ 2(1−Kv)2 + 2(1−Kv)
Tv
+ 2O(K
T
)
≤ 16 lnT
∆2i
(
1−Kv
1− (K − 1)v
)
+ 2O(1) + 2O(K
T
)
Now we can get the total regret is:
RegT =
∑
i 6=i∗
∆iE [mT (i)]
≤
∑
i:∆i>0
[
16 lnT
∆i
(
1−Kv
1− (K − 1)v
)
+ 2(1−Kv)2∆i + 2O(1)
]
+O(1)
≤
∑
i:∆i>0
[
16 lnT
∆i
(
1−Kv
1− (K − 1)v
)
+ 2(1−Kv)2∆i
]
+O(K)
This bound is not always tight, because when ∆ → O( 1T ) and v  1K , this bound will become
linear. Therefore, for any ∆ ∈ [0, 1] we can further write that as
RegT =
∑
∆i≤∆
∆iE [mT (i)] +
∑
∆i>∆
∆iE [mT (i)]
≤ ∆d(1−Kv)T e+
∑
∆i>∆
[
16 lnT
∆i
(
1−Kv
1− (K − 1)v
)
+ 2(1−Kv)2∆i
]
+O(K)
By choosing ∆ =
√
K ln(T )
T , we got the worst case guarantee,
RegT ≤ T∆ +
∑
∆i>∆
[
16 lnT
∆i
+ 2∆i
]
+O(K)
≤ O(
√
TK lnT +K lnT )
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6.4 Proof for algorithm 2
6.4.1 Notations
Denote the distribution over arms at time t as pt where pt(argmaxi∈[K] UCBt(i)) = (1−Kv) + v
and pt(i) = v,∀i ∈ [K] \ argmaxi∈[K] UCBt(i). And the best distribution as p∗ where p∗(i∗) =
(1−Kv) + v and p∗(i) = v,∀i ∈ [K] \ i∗.
6.4.2 Main Proof
First we rewrite this regret in the form of variable ∆i and mT ,
E
[
T∑
t=1
Eit∼p∗ [rt(it)]− Eit∼pt [rt(it)]
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
Eit∼p∗ [µ(it)]− Eit∼pt [µ(it)]
]
= E
T∑
t=1
(1− (K − 1)v)µ(i∗) + v∑
i 6=i∗
µ(i)− pt(i∗)µ(i∗)−
∑
i 6=i∗
pt(i)µ(i)

= E
T∑
t=1
(1− pt(i∗))µ(i∗)−∑
i 6=i∗
pt(i)µ(i) + v
∑
i6=i∗
µ(i)− µ(i∗)

= E
T∑
t=1
∑
i 6=i∗
pt(i)∆i − v
∑
i6=i∗
∆i

=
∑
i 6=i∗
∆iE
[
T∑
t=1
pt(i)
]
− vT
∑
i 6=i∗
∆i
=
∑
i 6=i∗
∆iE
[
T∑
t=1
1{it = i}
]
− vT
∑
i 6=i∗
∆i
=
∑
i 6=i∗
∆iE [nT (i)]− vT
∑
i 6=i∗
∆i
Notice here the expectation is regarding to the both the randomness of environment and learner’s
choice of it, which is a bit different from previous proof. The penultimate equality is due to
Eleaner at t[1{it = i}] = pt(i) and the linearity of expectation.
Next we want to bound E [nT ] following the similar idea as in the original UCB paper.
E[nT (i)] = n+
T∑
t=n+1
Prob [(it = i) and nt−1 > n] (n here is simply for analysis)
≤ n+
T∑
t=n+1
(1−Kv) ∗ Prob(UCB(i) > UCB(i∗) and nt−1(i) > n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term1
+v

Here n can be any non-negative integer. In the later analysis, choice of n helps us to get a tighter
bound.
Now we analyze the TERM1 using the almost same technique as proof for algorithm 2
TERM1 ≤ Prob [UCBt(i∗) < µ(i∗)] + Prob [UCBt(i) > µ(i∗) and nt−1 > n]
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≤ Prob
[
µ(i∗)− µˆt(i∗) ≥ 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i∗)
]
+ Prob
[
µˆt(i)− µ(i) ≥ ∆i − 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
and nt−1 > n
]
First, observe that Prob
[
µ(i∗)− µˆt(i∗) ≥ 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i∗)
]
has nothing to do with n, we can directly
apply Lemma 1 to get upper the bound. Again we want to know what is the [ks, ke]. Because there
is no prescheduling here, so it is simply just [1, t−K]. So the upper bound is
t−K∑
k=1
1
T 2
<
1
T
Then we are going to deal with Prob
[
µˆt(i)− µ(i) ≥ ∆i − 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
and nt−1 > n
]
. Again
we want to use the Lemma 1, but we need to choose n at first. The reason we want to choose n is that
we consider the first n epoch the bound will be very loose, so we can directly bound the probability
by 1. However, consider the extreme case where v → 1K , so (1−Kv)→ 0, so the choice of arm is
totally random and has nothing to do with UCB algorithms, so we can simply choose n = 0 and all
the probabilities will be naturally bounded by 1.
Therefore, here I compute two cases, n = [ 16 lnT
∆2i
] and n = 0.
When n = 0, simply bound the probability by 1.
When n = [ 16 lnT
∆2i
], observed that
∆i − 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
= 4
√
lnT
n
− 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
≥ 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
We can again apply Lemma 1 as before and get
Prob
[
µˆt(i)− µ(i) ≥ ∆i − 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
and nt−1 > n
]
≤ Prob
[
µˆt(i)− µ(i) ≥ 2
√
lnT
nt−1(i)
]
≤ 1
T
Therefore, combine the two cases, we conclude bound for i 6= i∗
E[nT (i)] ≤ min
{
16 lnT
∆2i
+ (1−Kv), (1−Kv)T
}
+ vT
Now we can get the total regret is:
RegT =
∑
i 6=i∗
∆iE [nT (i)]− vT
∑
i 6=i∗
∆i
≤
∑
i:∆i>0
[
min
{
16 lnT
∆i
+ (1−Kv)∆i, (1−Kv)∆iT
}]
This bound is not always tight, because when ∆ → O( 1T ) and v  1K , this bound will become
linear. Therefore, for any ∆ ∈ [0, 1] we can further write that as
RegT ≤
∑
∆i≤∆
∆iE [nT (i)] +
∑
∆i>∆
∆iE [nT (i)]− vT
∑
∆i>∆
∆i
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≤ ∆T +
∑
i:∆i>∆
[
min
{(
16 lnT
∆i
+ (1−Kv)∆i
)
, (1−Kv)∆iT
}]
By choosing ∆ =
√
K ln(T )
T , we got the worst case guarantee,
RegT ≤ T∆ +
∑
∆i>∆
[
16 lnT
∆i
+ 2∆i
]
+O(K2)
≤ O(
√
TK lnT +K lnT )
16
